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Abstract. In our modern societies, socio-technological 
systems and human system interactions are taking on a 
large part in numerous domains such as health, control of 
risk, people safety, communication, information 
technologies, and so on. In order to manage such systems, it 
is necessary to put in place the most relevant indicators. To 
facilitate decision making in various fields such as people 
safety and risk management, the definition of indicators 
generated by such systems is needed in order to deliver the 
appropriate action plan especially to control occupational 
accidents.  
 
The aim of the article is to present our approach to analyze 
and define this category of new indicators. 
 
Keywords: Sociological and psychological aspects, 
measurement systems, safety indicators, risk management. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Statistics from International Labor Organization and 
Worldwide Health Organization [1] put in evidence that 2 
million occupational fatalities occur each year worldwide 
(e.g. around 1 fatality every 20 seconds) divided in 1.7 
million due to occupational diseases and 0.3 million due 
to occupational accidents (plus 268 million lost time 
accidents  more than 3 days out of work). To compare 
with, there were 2 million soldiers killed each year during 
the First World War that is to say as many as workers 
killed each year worldwide. Beyond all human and ethic 
stakes, the economic impact of fatalities at work, 
estimated to 1 250 billion dollars (e.g. 4 % of worldwide 
GNP), is quite huge. This problem has to be solved 
globally, either for rich or poor countries. Hubert Curien, 
a French scientist, liked to say that for industrialized 
countries, technology and innovation are often considered 
by public opinion as a risk (like « heaven »). On the 
contrary for emerging countries, it is a vital opportunity. 
Each state must build its own history and culture. But we 
need more solidarity, shared effort and equity in business, 
while reducing risk at the source. A good example is 
REACH regulation because even if a new dynamic is 
complicated to implement, it should be a reference in all 
other countries so as to reinforce prevention and avoid 
drifting risks and accidents in developing countries. 
Behind global figures, we can find several situations 
worldwide.  For instance, occupational fatalities are 
around: 5 500 in the USA, 100 000 in China, 6 000 in 
Russia and 40 000 in South America… It is still far too 
much. The importance of safety must be considered as a 
shared value and a fundamental principle. 
II. SAFETY INDICATORS  
 
One of the main objectives put in evidence by 
companies is « zero accident ». It is often merely required 
by regulation. For instance, in France, companies must 
prevent any kind of accident whatever means. The motto 
« zero accident » often corresponds to a very positive 
commitment, to a high motivation and conviction to 
implement a system of values and reach very high level 
of performance. However, we have to be vigilant because 
some bias can appear. As an example, we can remember 
the so-called « better, faster, cheaper » programme 
launched by NASA, considered as one of the root cause 
of Challenger and Columbia accidents. Each action is 
multidimensional. Complexity of sociotechnical system 
can generate bias. We must try to step back, and have in 
mind that if we don’t make decision it is still as if we 
were taking a decision. 
The accident of BP refinery in Texas on March 23rd, 
2005 should remain in all memories in order to learn 
lessons of what happened (15 fatalities, 170 severely 
injured, 700 million dollars to the victims, 2.3 million for 
OSHA safety and hygiene violations, plus the ones 
corresponding to environmental violations). 
 
Baker’s report (January, 2007) [2] starts like that: « 
Other companies and their stakeholders can benefit from 
our work. We urge these companies to regularly and 
thoroughly evaluate their safety culture ». As a 
consequence and following the conclusions of various 
reports, BP launched several programmes on leadership 
and on process safety management (PSM) and planned to 
invest 1 billion dollars over a 5 years period in the 
refinery. The Group decided to internalize some technical 
activities that had been outsourced during the past and to 
reinforce internal expertise. Here can be highlighted a 
very classical question: could we expect such an accident 
by meaning of specific indicators? Baker’s report 
indicates: « The literature also suggests and the panel 
believes that the presence of an effective personal safety 
management system does not ensure the presence of an 
effective process safety management system. As 
discussed elsewhere in this report, BP’s personal injury 
rates were not predictive of process safety performance at 
BP’s five US refineries ». There are other comments 
about this topic: « BP has emphasized personal safety in 
recent years and has achieved significant improvement in 
personal safety performance, but BP did not emphasize 
process safety. BP mistakenly interpreted improving 
personal injury rates as an indication of acceptable 
process safety performance at its US refineries. BP’s 
reliance on this data, combined with inadequate process 
safety understanding, created a false sense of confidence 
that BP was properly addressing safety risks. The panel 
further found that process safety leadership appeared to 
have suffered as a result of high turnover of refinery plant 
managers ». 8 plant managers were successively hired 
over a period of 6 years on site composed with 1 800 BP 
staff and 2 000 outside workers. BP had launched 
programmes to improve behavior and risk awareness, 
which could decrease the conventional frequency rate of 
lost time accident by 70 %. By referring to this only one 
indicator, one could feel honestly to improve situation.  
 
A. Current indicators 
The Conventional Frequency Rate (CFR) is an 
indicator used to measure the number of lost time 
accidents over a period of time per million worked hours. 
However, even if it is widely used, it does not represent a 
full control of risk performance especially for major risks, 
nor even for specific risks. CFR compiles each type of 
accidents whatever causes, and we all know that to be 
efficient to prevent accident we must act on causes. We 
still have to focus on causes, analyze events and manage 
feedback. 
 
The CFR is the number of lost time accidents over one 
day over a period of 12 months in general, per million 
worked hours. The CFR is defined by the ratio:  
CFR = 
       
   
 
 
With CFR: Conventional Frequency Rate, LTA: number 
of lost time accident and NWH   : number of worked 
hours
1
. 
Another indicator is the Severity Rate (SR):  
SR =  
      
   
 
 
With LD: number of days lost 
Using this indicator is not as simple. It is possible to 
determine the sensitivity factor of CFR versus the size of 
the sample of people (Table 1). The graph on Fig. 1 
determines the impact factor of on lost time accident 
when the sample is varying between 1 and 5 000. 
 
                                                          
1
 The number of worked hours is calculated by 
multiplying the number of workers with the average 
annual working hours of a full time employee. 
TABLE 1: SENSITIVITY FACTOR VERSUS THE SIZE OF THE SAMPLE 
 
Sample Impact factor 
1 613,4969325 
2 306,7484663 
5 122,6993865 
10 61,34969325 
50 12,26993865 
100 6,134969325 
500 1,226993865 
1 000 0,613496933 
5 000 0,122699387 
 
 
Fig. 1: Indicator of result or follow up [4] 
 
The moment when an accident occurs on the time 
horizon (usually 12 months) can also have an impact. Let 
us take an example where a plant has got one accident 
over a 12 months period. If the accident is occurring in 
January: 
 
• The CFR in January is 12 times higher than it will be 
at the end of December. 
• The cumulative CFR will be impacted all the 
yearlong. 
 
If the accident occurs in December, between January 
and the end of November, the indicator will be equal to 
zero with a “feeling” to control risks. 
In December, the indicator will turn red with the 
feeling that suddenly the situation was worsen, e.g. before 
the accident everything seems ok and after the accident 
everything seems bad. 
It is not because we hold the handrail while climbing 
down the stairs on a tank with flammable solvent that it 
will not explode as Andrew Hale often says. We must do 
both: to hold the handrail and to manage other risks as 
«process » ones. It is also important to step back. For 
instance, the risk awareness programme to improve 
vigilance had been launched when they had at the same 
time shift operators working more than 30 successive 12 
hours shifts. The question of global coherence is raised. 
In addition to that, 300 violations were identified on 
equipments by several surveys following the accidents 
and we can remind that the year before the explosion, 
there were 2 fatalities in the refinery (in 2004). 
Let us consider « classical indicators » for Texas City 
Explosion. Data for 1999-2009 period are available on 
BP internet site as well as lots of comments.  Let us take a 
horizon of 4 years before the explosion e.g. 2001-2004 
and another horizon of 4 years after the explosion e.g. 
2006-2009, the number of killed workers (BP personals 
and outside workers) has considerably decreased by 23 
(from 60 to 37). This result is probably due to specific 
action plans on corresponding risks. If we want to reduce 
risks with high potential from severe accidents to 
fatalities we have to act on the specific root cause of these 
specific risks (and not only on the causes that have an 
impact on the CFR).  
 
Regulation in France or in the USA (for instance, 
OSHA form number 300) demands to publish the CFR. 
As a consequence CFR must be available. This indicator 
must be stored and in fact is often used (and still used e.g. 
anchored bias) as an « absolute » measure of safety 
performance, as « benchmark » for other companies and 
is used to define policies and objectives  based on “zero” 
accident motto. CFR can be relevant to measure some 
situations, but not for others (e.g. for PSM); on a 
statistical standpoint it can even be non-relevant when 
accident rate is very low. It is thus important to analyze 
how organizations work. Usually, companies set annual 
objectives with a percentage of improvement year by 
year. We have to spend time to assess how the objectives 
are pertinent and coherent by years: what is improved 
year by year is it always coherent on the long term? CFR 
can be improved for example by implementing behavioral 
programme that can be useful to some extent, but we 
have to define the frame and the corresponding limits. 
 
Baker’s report (others can be found, e.g. Mogford’s 
report) puts in evidence some important causes: lack of 
maintenance, lack of process safety management and 
associated expertise. These causes are not reported in 
usual scorecards compared to CFR. 
B. Edge effects of indicators 
It is possible to improve CFR year by year by working 
on programme based on behavior and awareness, while at 
the same moment reducing annual maintenance or 
training budget or specific expertise that are mandatory 
for future performance, even for sustained business. This 
point has especially to be taken into account when 
considering manager turnover. A too big turn over can 
introduce strong bias, e.g. to get quick wins only 
compared to long term actions which are fundamental. 
The system of annual objectives must take into account 
those dimensions and must ensure a full coherence 
between short term and long term objectives. As for 
example, ergonomic: to avoid hazardous situations that 
will generate problems in the future (when managers will 
have turned over). Organizations must ensure short term 
and long term coherence: both are important and interact.  
 
Global control of risks must be based on prioritizing as 
regulation is requiring too. When companies want to 
improve EHS performance, they have to define the right 
indicators because the top managers will then focus on 
them. Let us remind the comments from Herbert Simon’s 
economic Nobel Prize: « the most important resource is 
not information but the awareness of actors ». When top 
managers are committed to EHS, we must have relevant 
indicators to assess the efficiency of policies. What is also 
important is to ask oneself as far as possible and as often 
as possible the right questions. Then to understand and 
act in the right direction, as Deming used to say, « Best 
efforts are not enough; you have to know where to go ». 
III. EXAMPLE: COMPANIES FROM CAC40 STOCK 
EXCHANGE INDEX 
 
We made a study to compare CFR and Severity rate for 
companies belonging to CAC40 in order to understand 
the indicators that are used.   
Conventional CFR measures the number of lost time 
accidents per million worked hours over a period of time, 
usually one year. This definition is used in France and in 
some other countries. In the USA, the indicator refers to 
0.2 million of worked hours. In some companies, there 
can be used other comparable indicators taking into 
account other events (first aid …).  
 
Severity rate measures the number of days out per 
million worked hours over a period of time usually one 
year. 
 
These two indicators are measuring the frequency of 
accidents and their severity. So the greater they are the 
more accidents are occurring with high consequences in 
term of number of days out of work. A company that is 
investing in the control of risk generally is measuring the 
efficiency of its actions by the improvement that is by 
reducing these two indicators. 
 
Even if the CFR is widely used within companies, it is 
a non-trivial measure – including safety specialists. A 
value of 5 is better than 10, itself better than 20, but what 
is the meaning of this indicator. Another way to try to 
address the problem is to calculate the CFR of each 
employee by considering for instance that only had one 
lost time accident in their whole working life. The orders 
of magnitude can vary with a factor from 1 to 10. This 
demonstrates how it is difficult to give sense to CFR. The 
result of calculation is around 13.5 in France. If we 
consider an average of annual working hours with other 
European countries with USA and Japan, we can 
determine an average CFR around 10. So it means that 
within a company with a CFR equals to 10 (that remains 
at 10) each employee will get injured once in all his 
working life.   
Severity Rate is also hard to understand: what is the 
meaning? However it is possible to calculate the ratio 
CFR/SR that determines the number of days off per lost 
time accident, but it is rarely used. The analysis of global 
results (see table 2) shows a significant result:  
transportation activities (aviation, railway and subway) 
rare gathering data among the highest in term of CFR. 
 
 
TABLE 2: THE DATA REFER TO SUSTAINABILITY REPORTS 
AVAILABLE ON THE INTERNET (2009) 
Companies Safety Indicators Values 
Suez environnement  
CAC40 
CFR 17.45 
SR 0.5 
Veolia Environnement  
CAC40 
CFR 38.1 
SR 1.63 
RATP  
CFR 38.6 
SR 1.41 
SNCF CFR 33.87 
Air France  SR 27.62 
KLM  CFR 21.66 
Bouygues CAC40 
  
CFR 12.3 
SR 0.49 
Vinci  CAC40 
  
CFR 11.59 
SR 0.64 
Haliburton (USA)  CFR 4.85 
GDF Suez CAC40 
CFR 11.2 
SR 0.44 
Schneider Electric 
CAC40 
CFR 9.8 
SR 0.09 
EDF CAC40 
CFR 6.2 
SR 0.2 
Saint Gobain  CAC40 
CFR 4.8 
SR 0.22 
Lafarge CAC40 
CFR 1.57 
SR 0.14 
L'Oréal  CAC40 Frequency rate 2.3 
Rhodia  Frequency rate 0.59 
Gravity rate 0.046 
Sanofi Aventis  CAC40 Frequency rate 2.6 
Peugeot CAC40 Frequency rate 3.43 
Renault  CAC40 Frequency rate 2 
Alcatel Lucent  CAC40 Frequency rate 1.72 
Vivendi  CAC40 Frequency rate 2.72 
France Télécom 
CAC40 
Frequency rate 4.1 
Société générale 
CAC40 
Number of paid 
day of absence due 
to illness 
808 
334 
Crédit agricole CAC40 
Number of 
accident (France) 
1 300 
Number of paid 
day of absence due 
to illness 
726 
230 
BNP Paribas CAC40 
Absence rate for 
accident 
0.09 
AXA CAC40 
Absence rate for 
accident 
0.02 
La Poste  Frequency rate 24.64 
Danone CAC40 Frequency rate 5.2 
Arcelor Mittal  CAC40 Frequency rate 2.3 
Michelin CAC40 
Frequency rate 1.85 
Gravity rate 0.21 
Air Liquide CAC40 Frequency rate 1.8 
Total  CAC40 Frequency rate 2.21 
Vallourec CAC40 
Frequency rate 7.8 
Gravity rate 0.38 
Carrefour  CAC40 
Absence rate for 
accident 
0.62 
Lagardère CAC40 
Frequency rate 9.85 
Gravity rate 0.32 
 
 
 
 
 
As a comment: if the CFR was measuring by the whole 
safety performance of a company (as it is often 
considered), we should be facing big weaknesses in the 
control of risks of these transportation activities. On the 
contrary, millions of passengers are travelling safely each 
year, and those activities, which are one of the most 
regulated and inspected, are considered as very reliable. 
To go on further, Air France and KLM, which belong 
now to the same Group, still have huge differences due to 
the legal classification of accident between France and 
Netherlands.   
 
So, barotrauma otitis and back injuries, classified as 
occupational accidents in France and that represents 40 % 
of lost time accidents within Air France, are classified as 
absenteeism for occupational disease within KLM, in 
compliance with Netherlands regulation. This makes it 
difficult to compare indicators even within the same 
Group. We can notice on the other hand that the rate of 
participation of flying teams in training activities is 
100%.  
 
A second point must be highlighted: Companies from 
CAC40, that have the lower CFR, have the ratio of 
number of days off per lost time the bigger (around 100 
e.g. on average each lost time accident corresponds to 
more than 3 months off, when those that get the higher 
CFR get half of this ratio). This clearly shows that by 
controlling most frequent accidents you do not control the 
most severe accidents automatically. 
 
Even more important, these two indicators do not take 
into account fatalities which are the ones to avoid at first. 
 
Furthermore for one company we can determine that 
for a period of 10 years the duration of days lost per lost 
time accident (DPLTA)2 is increasing  almost 
continuously from around 30 days to 100 days while CFR 
is decreasing continuously (see Fig. 2). 
It appears that there are fewer accidents but much more 
severe ones. 
 
Based only on CFR, you could consider that prevention 
is improving but taking into account DPLTA the 
prevention is worse. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2
 DPLTA = 
  
       
 
days lost per lost time accident times 1000 eg the severity 
of each accident . 
Fig. 2: CFR versus DPLTA 
 
IV. PROPOSAL TO DEFINE A METHODOLOGY TO 
BUILD INDICATORS 
 
New indicators must include a management dimension, 
in the Tanzi and Textoris’ study [2012] [4] and Kaplan’s 
study [1992] [5], which corresponds to classical 
indicators, but equally a piloting dimension that is still to 
be defined. Difference lies on the fact that information to 
pilot is directly linked to how to drive action, while 
management information is dedicated to information 
structure of the company.  
In order to facilitate how to use them, so how to 
interpret them, they can be organized in synthetic 
scorecard. Research from Kaplan and Norton on the 
notion of "balanced scorecard" [5] [Kaplan 92], [6] 
[Kaplan 96] is a key contribution to our field of study. 
 
More precisely : "a performance indicator that can help 
a manager, at an individual or more often at a team levels, 
to pilot the action up to the objective or that can allow to 
assess the result …"  [7] [Lorino 2003]. So it is not an 
"absolute" measure, a characteristic of the measured 
phenomenon independently from the observer. It is built 
by the actor [8] [Lorino 1995]. 
 
We can then define an indicator as so: As a 
consequence, it is a sophisticated management tool with 
some specific features. For example: 
 The strategic objective to which it is linked, its 
targets with timeframe and measurable features, the 
relevant references, 
 The clear identification of who is in charge to deliver 
them, and the one in charge of its performance, 
 Frequency and follow up, 
 Technical definition : formula and calculation 
convention, sources of information, … 
 Segmentation modes to decompose  aggregated form 
: geographical data, type of product, center … 
 Presentation (ex: numerical data, tables, graphics, 
…) and communication list. 
Such an indicator is composed by two different 
functions depending on how it is located compared to the 
action (see Fig. 3). It can be an indicator of result. In that 
case, it gives an assessment of the final result when the 
action is completed. But it can also be a follow up 
indicator. It allows to anticipate or to react on time. By 
definition, the result indicator comes too late to shift the 
action. 
 
 
Fig. 3: indicator of result or follow up [4] 
 
The way it is located compared to the structure of 
power and responsibility gives it also a final duality (Fig. 
4). The corresponding reporting gives an indication of the 
percentage realization of the objectives, which can be 
considered as a control a posteriori, and the piloting 
whose objective is to adapt actions in progress. 
 
Fig. 4: Leading indicator or reporting [4] 
 
The composition of such an indicator must take into 
account aspects linked to operational relevance as for 
example, combining indicator / action, the question of 
“controllability", and the impact of levers on actions. 
 
It is also necessary to take into account some aspects 
linked to strategic relevance such as, for example, the 
association of indicator / objective[9] [Kerr 1975], [10] 
[Epstein 1998], the measure of the completion of the 
results (Indicator of result), and data on how actions are 
implemented  (Leading Indicator). 
 
This reflection must be completed with another 
dimension concerning the cognitive efficiency. Indeed, 
these indicators are used by the actors in a given context. 
They influence the action and the way it is understood. It 
is so necessary to define how to read them, to understand 
and to interpret as soon as the indicators are designed. It 
is the only condition to set a frame to take into account 
the context of the actor, and that is easy to use. 
Some questions are rising when we want to define 
indicators. Do we want to use financial indicators, or non-
financial, or use a mix of both? If we define non-financial 
indicators, is it better to valorize the stakes? What is the 
right number of indicators to get a clear and coherent 
picture?  
It appears necessary to dissociate management 
indicators and piloting indicators [11] [Hopkins 2007].  
 
The way indicators are organized within a scorecard, 
for example as for balanced scorecard, makes it possible 
to have both types of indicators financial and non-
financial. Indicators are organized in four parts:  learning, 
process, customers and financial aspect. Inside the 
scorecard, indicators are linked with a causal model. 
 
We have seen previously that indicators can focus on 
past information as so-called indicators of result (lagging 
indicator) [Mitchell 1938]. They can also take into 
account information on current performance that can act 
on future performance. They are called indicators of 
action or advanced indicators or piloting indicators or 
alert indicator (leading indicator) [12] [Mitchell 1938]. 
Mitchell, in his work [Mitchell 1938], had also defined 
Coïncident indicator that puts in evidence events almost 
happening at the same moment (coïncident indicator). 
 
So we can organize indicators within balanced 
scorecard that makes it possible to have at the same time 
financial and non-financial indicators.  
V. CONCLUSION 
 
The various sociotechnical activities need specific 
control system adapted to the stakes and complexity of 
their environment in order to reach their goals. In the 
field of prevention of risks for workers, ethical and 
human stakes are paramount. Based on statistics from 
International Labor Organization and Worldwide Health 
Organization [1], we can give the following data. There 
are 2 000 000 fatalities at work each year worldwide 
divided in 1 700 000 fatalities due to occupational 
diseases and 300 000 due to occupational accidents (plus 
268 million lost time accidents  more than 3 days out of 
work). 
 
To compare with these 2 000 000 fatalities we can 
remind other worldwide figures: 
 
• 999 000 fatalities on the road (~ 1 million). 
• 563 000 fatalities due to violence (~ 1/2 million). 
• 502 000 fatalities due to war (~ 1/2 million). 
• 312 000 fatalities due to VIH/Aids (~ 1/3 million). 
 
Beyond all human and ethic stakes, the economic 
impact of fatalities at work, estimated to 1 250 billion 
dollars, e.g. 4 % of worldwide GNP, is quite huge.  
Politics have to develop strong vision and concrete 
policies of prevention to solve this very important 
problem for the whole world. 
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When reading various Sustainable Corporate Reports, 
we can notice that some companies take into account the 
CFR of outside contractors but this is not generalized. To 
compare companies using widely subcontractors in a 
more relevant way this activity would have to be 
included.  Moreover, in order to use statistics properly, 
we have to be rigorous and do not use data out of their 
context. Indeed to determine if the CFR is good or not, it 
can be useful to know the average of companies from the 
same sector of activity. How can be relevant to compare 
companies from so different sectors as construction or 
pharmaceuticals? 
 
Then CFR does not demonstrate necessarily the 
existence of direct links with efforts invested in safety 
and health programmes and improvements achieved. We 
can give the example of AIR France KLM with a CFR 
equals to 28.62 when the rate of participation of flying 
teams in training activities is 100%.  
 
Another example, Michelin has got a CFR equals to 
1.85 and CFR equals to 0 for 30 of its plants, so the 
company is one of the leader for manufacturing 
companies. But Michelin was obliged to put in place 
other indicators as the rate of participation to preventing 
actions, because classical indicators as CFR were no 
more sufficient.  
 
So CFR is one of the most used indicators of the Safety 
Management System to measure company performance 
but this indicator has got intrinsic limits. It must then be 
used with other indicators that demonstrate all together 
the level of risk control. It should be appropriate to put in 
place other indicators such as the participation rate or the 
measure of efficiency with time if we want to 
demonstrate what makes the system work or result 
indicators such as the measure of the number of accidents 
avoided for instance to show the impact of actions. 
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